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1. INTRODUCTION
When the United States, a successor government in Cuba, and
affected private parties eventually enter negotiations to resolve the
U.S. nationals' outstanding claims for the expropriation of their
assets in Cuba during the early years of the Cuban Revolution,
they will have a variety of remedies from which to choose.' This
Article, which complements an earlier article discussing the legal
and practical issues involved in the resolution of similar expropria-
tion claims by Cuban nationals,' examines these alternative
remedies.
The expropriation claims by U.S. and Cuban nationals against
Cuba share a number of common elements. The underlying facts
surrounding the expropriations are similar, as is Cuba's failure to
* Partner, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge (Washington, D.C.). J.D.
1976, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1971, Ohio State University; M.S. 1967, B.S.
1966, University of Miami. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
of Pablo Perez in the preparation of this Article.
' In this Article, the term "U.S. nationals" refers to natural persons who
were U.S. citizens at the time their properties in Cuba were seized by the
Cuban government, as well as corporations or other entities organized under
the laws of the United States and at least 50% of whose stock or other
beneficial interest was owned by natural persons who were citizens of the
United States at the time the entities' properties in Cuba were taken. See 22
U.S.C. S 1643a(1) (1994). Individuals and entities meeting this definition were
eligible to participate in the Cuban Claims Program established by Congress in
1964 to determine the amount and validity oftheir claims against the Cuban
government for the uncompensated taking of their properties after January 1,
1959. See 22 U.S.C. S 1643 (1994); infra note 14 and accompanying text.
2 See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the
Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 217 (1995) [hereinafter Cuban Claims Resolution].
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provide compensation to either group of claimants. Both
categories of claimants will also compete for the Cuban
government's limited resources? Additionally, for internal
political reasons, Cuba may need to provide roughly equivalent
remedies to both Cuban and U.S. nationals. Therefore, many of
the issues raised in the earlier article are also applicable here.
This Article, as in the earlier article, assumes that as it
transforms into a free-market society, Cuba would attempt to
reach a settlement of U.S. nationals' outstanding claims and
compensate them for expropriated property.' As will be
discussed in the next section, such an assumption is based on well-
settled international law doctrines, principles of Cuban and U.S.
law, and long-standing tenets of U.S. policy towards Cuba.
While this Article examines a variety of options for addressing
the outstanding U.S. nationals' expropriation claims against Cuba,
it does not present any specific proposals or formulas for handling
3 Citing U.S. government figures, Cuban Parliament President and former
Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon asserted that the outstanding expropriation
claims by U.S. and Cuban nationals could total approximately $100 billion, a
figure representing 50 times Cuba's average receipt from exports in the prior
two years. See Alarcon: Nation 'U.S. Protectorate' With Helms-Burton Bill,
PRENSA LATINA, Nov. 1, 1995, available in F.B.I.S. (LAT-95-215), Nov. 7, 1995,
at 1 [hereinafter Alarcon]. In response to the size of claims against the Cuban
government, Alarcon stated that "[either] we would have to return the
properties to the former owners or that we would have to allocate the
countr's revenues for half a century to amortize the debt in order for the
United States to lift its hostile policies on Cuba, regardless of the ideological
orientation of its government." Id.
4 See, e.g., Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Steven R. Escobar, Cuba's Transition
to a Free-Market Democracy: A Survey of Required Changes to Laws and Legal
Institutions, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 379, 412 (1995); Rolando H.
Castafieda & George Plinio Montalvan, Economic Factors in Selecting an
Approach to Expropriation Claims in Cuba, in 3 CUBA IN TRANsmON: PAPERS
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSocIATION
FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 1 (1993).
s See Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 2, at 217 & n.1 for a discussion
of various views on whether any remedy should be provided for Cuba's
property expropriations. Although the issue may be subject to debate in the
case of Cuban nationals, it is very likely (for the reasons discussed later in this
paper) that the claims of U.S. nationals will have to be given an appropriate
remedy. Cuba has repeatedly acknowledged its obligation to provide such a
remedy and its willingness to enter into negotiations with the United States to
achieve a settlement of the U.S. claims. See, eg., Alarcon, supra note 3, at 1;
Olga Miranda Bravo, There Is No U.S. Property in Cuba that Could Affect
Investors, CUBA FOREIGN TRADE Gan.-Mar. 1994), at 13. Cuba, however, has
advanced no concrete proposals toward the resolution of the claims issue.
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such claims. As with Cuban nationals' claims, it is likely that
Cuba's then-current economic and political conditions will dictate
which approaches are viable. Such conditions cannot be predicted
at this time, because there is no evidence that Cuba and the
United States are prepared to discuss the issue in the immediate
future.
2. SYNOPSIS OF CUBA'S EXPROPRIATIONS AND RESULTING
CLAIMS
2.1. Introduction
Cuba nationalized the properties of U.S. and other foreign
nationals on the island starting in 1959, with the bulk of the
expropriations taking place in the second half of 1960.6 The
process started in 1959 with the seizure of agricultural and cattle
ranches under the Agrarian Reform Law7 and reached a critical
stage in July 1960 with the promulgation of Law 851, which
authorized the taking of U.S. nationals' property.' The statute
was carried out through several resolutions in the second half of
1960, primarily directed against properties owned by U.S.
nationals, although other foreign nationals' properties were also
taken.9 These actions continued through 1963, when the last U.S.
companies that were still in private hands were expropriated."
In a parallel process, most assets owned by Cuban nationals,
except for small parcels of land, homes, and personal items, were
6 For a detailed description of the process by which Cuba expropriated the
assets of U.S. nationals, see MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONAL-
IZATIONS: TE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-108 (1976).
7 See Ley de Reforma Agraria [Agrarian Reform Law], published in Gaceta
Oficial, June 3, 1959, at 2.
' See Ley No. 851 [Law 851 of Nationalization of July 6, 1960], published
in Gaceta Oficial, July 7, 1960, at 16,367.
' See Resolution No. 1, Aug. 6, 1960, noted in FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLE-
MENT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM 78 (1972)
[hereinafter 1972 FCSC REPORT]; Resolution No. 2, Sept. 17, 1960, noted in
1972 FCSC REPORT 78; Ley No. 890 [Law No. 890 of Oct. 13, 1960], published
in Gaceta Oficial, Oct. 13, 1960, at 2; Resoluci6n No. 3, Oct. 24, 1960,
published in Gaceta Oficial, Oct. 24, 1960, at 1. For a listing of laws, decrees,
and resolutions by means of which Cuba's expropriation ofthe assets of U.S.
nationals were implemented, see 1972 FCSC REPORT 78-79.
10 See GORDON, supra note 6, at 105-06.
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seized at various times between 1959 and 1968.11
The laws issued to implement the expropriation of U.S.
nationals' holdings authorized the state to provide compensation
to the owners.12 Nevertheless, in almost all cases, no compensa-
tion was paid.13
In 1964, the U.S. Congress amended the International Claims
Settlement Act to establish a Cuban Claims Program, which gave
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States
("FCSC") authority to determine the validity and amount of
claims by U.S. nationals against the Cuban government for the
taking of their property retroactive to January 1, 1959.14 The
Cuban Claims Program of the FCSC was active between 1966 and
1972. During that time, it received 8,816 claims by U.S. corpora-
tions (1,146) and individual citizens (7,670)."5 It certified 5,911
of those claims, with an aggregate amount of $1.8 billion;
16
" For a summary of Cuba's expropriations of the assets of its nationals,
see Nicolas J. Gutirrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights:
Castro's Systematic Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba, presented at the
American Bar Association's Annual Meeting on Aug. 9, 1994, in New Orleans,
La. (1994), reprinted in 1 LATIN AM. Bus. L. ALERT 5 (1994).
12 Law 851 of July 6, 1960 authorized the nationalization of the properties
of U.S. nationals. The law also provided for the provision of compensation
through thirty-year bonds yielding two percent interest, which would be
financed by the profits Cuba realized from sales of sugar in the United States
which exceeded three million tons, at no less than 5.75 cents per pound. The
mechanism set up by this law was illusory because the United States had
already virtually eliminated Cuba's sugar import quota. See Proclamation No.
3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960) (reducing Cuba's sugar quota in the U.S. market
by ninty-five percent). Nonetheless, the inclusion of this compensation scheme
in the law constituted an explicit acknowledgment by Cuba of its obligation to
indemnify the U.S. property owners for their losses.
13 See Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 2, at 220-21.
14 See 22 U.S.C. S 1643-1643(k) (1994).
15 See 1972 FCSC REPORT, supra note 9, Exhibit 15.
16 See id. The value of the certified claims against Cuba exceeds the
combined certified amounts of all other claims validated by the FCSC for
expropriations of U.S. nationals' assets by other countries, including the Soviet
Union, China, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Vietnam.
See FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N 1994 ANNuAL REPORT 146 (1994)
[hereinafter 1994 FCSC REPORT].
The total amount certified by the FCSC is almost twice the $956 million
book value of all U.S. investments in Cuba as of the end of 1959, as reported
by the U.S. Department of Commerce. See Jose F. Alonso & Armando M.
Lago, A First Approximation of the Foreign Assistance Requirements of a
Democratic Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
T=E THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF
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denied 1,195 claims, with an aggregate amount of $1.5 billion;-"
and dismissed without consideration (or saw withdrawn) 1,710
other claims."i
Of the $1.8 billion in certified claims, over 85% were asserted
by 898 corporate claimants, with the rest belonging to 5,013
individual claimants.19  There were only 131 claimants - 92
corporations and 39 individuals - with certified claims of more
than $1 million.20 Only 48 of the claimants, 43 of them corpora-
tions, had certified claims in excess of $5 million.2 These figures
demonstrate that U.S. claimants fall into two general categories:
a limited number, mostly corporations, with large claims, and a
larger group, mainly individuals, with small claims. This
breakdown suggests there may be ways to differentiate between
both classes of claimants in terms of remedies provided to each.'
Although the Cuban Claims Act did not expressly authorize
the inclusion of interest in allowed claims, the FCSC determined
that interest should be included as part of the value of the certified
claims.' Applying a simple 6% interest rate to the outstanding
$1.8 billion principal yields a present value, as of December 1995,
of over $5.6 billion. This amount includes neither the value of
claims disallowed for lack of adequate proof, nor those not
submitted to the FCSC during the period specified in the statute.24
THE CUBAN ECONOMY 168, 201 (1993). The valuation of the U.S. nationals'
expropriation claims has never been established in an adversary proceeding.
The FCSC certification process involves administrative hearings in which only
the claimants introduce evidence on the extent and value of their losses. See 45
C.F.R. S 531 (1995).
17 See 1972 FCSC REPORT, supra note 9, Exhibit 15.
12 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id. at 413; see also App. A to this Article for a list of the 131
claimants with certified claims in excess of $1 million.
21 See App. A.
'2 See infra section 4.
2 See 1972 FCSC REPORT, supra note 9, at 76. The applicable interest rate,
if any, would most likely be determined through negotiations between the
United States and Cuba.
24 The aggregate amount of the expropriation claims by Cuban nationals
has not been quantified precisely but is likely to be many times that of U.S.
citizen claims given the comprehensive nature of the Cuban government's
expropriations. One "crude estimate" of the Cuban national expropriation
claims puts their aggregate value at $7 billion, not counting interest. Alonso
& Lago, supra note 16, at 202-04.
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The expropriation claims by nationals of other countries were
considerably smaller than those of U.S. and Cuban nationals, and
for the most part have been settled through agreements between
Cuba and the respective countries, including Spain, France,
Switzerland, and Canada.25 Claims have been settled at a
fraction of the assessed value of the expropriated assets.2 6
2.2. Legal Basisfor U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims
U.S. nationals' expropriation claims are based on well-
established principles of international law recognizing the
sovereign right of states to expropriate the assets of foreign
nationals in the states' territory, but simultaneously requiring
"adequate, effective and prompt" compensation to aliens whose
property has been expropriated.' The "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation formulation was coined in 1938 by U.S.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull.28 Under current practice, the
21 See generally Michael W. Gordon, The Settlement of Claims for Expropriat-
ed Foreign Private Property Between Cuba and Foreign Nations Other than the
United States, 5 LAw. AM. 457 (1973) (describing the settlement agreements
reached between Cuba and various foreign natiois).
26 Spanish claims, for example, were valued at $350 million but were
ultimately settled for approximately $40 million. Even this limited amount was
not paid until 1994, three decades after the claims accrued. See Spain: Cuba to
Compensate Spaniards or Property Seizures, REUTER TEXTLINE, Feb. 15, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
27 See Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983), affd
mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES % 185-90 (1965). U.S. courts have held that Cuba's expropriations of
U.S. nationals' assets violated international law because Cuba failed to provide
adequate compensation and because it carried the expropriations out in a
discriminatory and retaliatory manner. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affid, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). See enerally THE CUBAN NATIONALIZA-
TIONS, supra note 6, at 109-152 (discussing the doctrine of prompt compensa-
tion in the context of expropriation claims against Cuba).
2' A shorthand phrase sometimes used for the Hull formula "just
compensation," meaning "in the absence of exceptional circumstances ... an
amount equivalent to the value of the property taken... paid at the time of
the taking ... and in a form economically usable by the foreign national."
Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 476 (1991)
(citation omitted); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES S 712 (1987).
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"prompt". element of the Hull formula means payment without
delay.29 The "adequate" element means that the payment should
reflect the "fair market value" or "value as a going concern" of the
expropriated property." The "effective" element is satisfied
when payment is made in the currency of the alien's home
country; in a convertible currency, as designated by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund; or in any other currency acceptable to the
party whose property has been expropriated.31 Cuba has clearly
failed to satisfy its obligations under international law with respect
to providing compensation for properties seized from U.S. nation-
als.3
2
Domestic Cuban law in effect at the time of the takings also
dictated that U.S. property owners should have received adequate
compensation for the expropriations.33 Cuban constitutions have
29 See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INvEST-
MENT: "THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES" 163 (1993).
30 See ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS AND EcONOMIc RELATIONS
774-76 (1991). Shihata explains the "adequacy" element of compensation as
follows: "Compensation will be deemed 'adequate' if it is based on the fair
market value of the taken asset as such value is determined immediately before
the time at which the taking occurred or the decision to take the asset became
publicly known." SHIHATA, supra note 29, at 161. Shihata defines fair market
value as:
[the] amount that a willing buyer would normally pay to a willing
seller after taking into account the nature of the investment, the
circumstances in which it would operate in the future and its specific
characteristics, including the period in which it has been in existence,
the proportion of tangible assets in the total investment and other
relevant factors.
Id. at 161-62.
31 See SHIHATA, supra note 29, at 163.
32 U.S. courts and legal scholars have concluded that at least some of the
expropriations of U.S. nationals' assets, such as those arising from Law 851 of
July 6, 1960, were contrary to international law because they were ordered in
response to U.S. actions to eliminate Cuba's sugar quota, and because they
discriminated against U.S. nationals. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Although the expropriations were contrary to international law, they were
legally effective in transferring title to the assets to the Cuban state. The
breach of Cuba's international law obligations, therefore, only gave rise to a
duty to compensate the former owners of the loss of their properties. See
Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 2, at 227-44.
3 See generally Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 2 (discussing the Cuban
domestic law basis for the rights of property owners in Cuba, including foreign
nationals, to receive adequate compensation for the expropriation of their
assets).
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traditionally recognized the state's right to take possession of
private property, provided that the taking is for a legitimate
public purpose and compensation is paid to the owner. Cuba's
1901 Constitution, the first constitution of the newly independent
nation, declared in Article 32:
No one shall be deprived of his property except by compe-
tent authority, upon proof that the condemnation is
required by public utility, and previous indemnification.
If the indemnification is not previously paid, the courts
shall protect the owners and, if needed, restore to them the
property.34
The Cuban Constitution enacted in July 1940, and in effect at
the time of the Revolution, gave broad recognition to private
property rights.35 In the 1940 Constitution, the state's right to
expropriate private property is defined in Article 24:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. No one can be
deprived of his property [except] by competent judicial
authority and for a justified cause of public utility or social
[interest], and always after payment of the corresponding
indemnity in cash, judicially fixed. Non-compliance with
these requisites shall determine the right of the person
whose property has been expropriated, to be protected by
the courts, and, if the case calls for it, to have his property
restored to him. The reality of the cause of public utility
or social interest, and the need for the expropriation, shall
be decided by the courts in case of impugnation.6
14 CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLicA DE CUBA (1901), published in Gaceta
Oficial,(Apr. 14, 1902), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITnTONS: A
COMPILATION OF THE POLTICAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT
NATIONS OF THE NEW WORLD 112, 119 (Gos6 Ignacio Rodriguez trans., 1905).
15 See CONSTITucI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA (1940) [Constitution]
arts. 87-96, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 610, 626-27 (Amos J.
Peaslee ed. & trans., 2d ed. n.d.) [hereinafter CONSTrrCI6N DE 1940].
36 Id. art. 24 at 614. The 1940 Constitution modified the corresponding
provision (Art. 32) of the 1901 Constitution in four major respects: (1) only
a judicial authority was empowered to authorize an expropriation; (2) property
could be taken both for reasons of public utility and social interest; (3)
compensation for the property had to be in cash, and the amount was to be set
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When Cuba's Revolutionary Government issued a Fundamen-
tal Law replacing the 1940 Constitution, the text of Article 24
referring to the state's limited expropriation rights remained
unchanged.17  Subsequent amendments to Article 24 of the
Fundamental Law, however, progressively removed the obstacles
to the state's expropriation of private property. The last of these
amendments, the Constitutional Reform Law of July 5, 1960 -
issued on the eve of the promulgation of Law 851 establishing the
right to nationalize U.S. citizen properties in Cuba - amended
Article 24 to read in relevant part:
No other natural person or corporate entity shall be
deprived of his property except by competent authority,
for a justified cause of public utility or social or national
interest. The procedure for the expropriations and the
methods and forms of payment will be established by law,
as well as the competent authority to declare the cause of
public utility or social or national interest and the necessi-
ty for the expropriation.38
This amendment severely weakened the protections against
expropriation by removing the following requirements: that the
action be taken by a competent judicial authority; that advance
payment be made in cash in an amount set by the courts for the
expropriation; and that the owner be able to challenge, before the
courts, the utility or need for the expropriation.39 Nonetheless,
the amendment continued to recognize a private party's right to
by the courts; and (4) challenges to the legitimacy of the purpose for the taking
could be raised, and would be decided by the courts. See id. Taken together,
these changes suggest that the framers of the 1940 Constitution wanted to
expand the State's ability to expropriate private property, but wished to ensure
that such takings were subject to judicial control as to the legitimacy of the
purpose of the taking. The framers also wanted to ensure that the international
law principle requiring "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation for
property expropriations was satisfied. See Cuban Claims Resolution,. supra note
2, at 232 n.50.
See Ley Fundamental, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 1 (Feb. 7, 1959).
Ley de Reforma Constitucional, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 1 (Uly 5,
1960) (translation by author).
11 See Gutierrez, supra note 11, at 7-9.
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compensation for the expropriation of his property.
The state's limited right to expropriate private property was
reaffirmed by the 1976 Constitution, which declared in Article 25:
The expropriation of property for reasons of public benefit
or social interest and with due compensation is authorized.
The law establishes the method for the expropriation and
the bases on which the need for and usefulness of this
action is to be determined as well as the form of the
compensation, taking into account the interest and the
economic and the social needs of the [owner]. 4'
The amended Fundamental Law of 1959 and the 1976 and
1992 Constitutions have diminished, if not eliminated, the Cuban
government's guarantees that private property owners would
receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event
of expropriation. Yet these constitutions still recognize two
fundamental requirements of a valid expropriation: (1) private
property can be taken only by the state for some legitimate public
purpose, and (2) such taking must be accompanied or followed by
the payment of compensation. Such principles remain part of
Cuba's legal tradition and therefore provide a legitimate basis
under Cuban law for providing remedies to U.S. nationals whose
properties were taken by the Cuban government. 41
40 CONSTITUcI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA (1976) [Constitution],
published in Gaceta Oficial, at 3, 6 (Feb. 24, 1976), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: CUBA 8 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert
H. Flanz eds., 1976). Article 25 of the 1992 Constitution, currently in effect
in Cuba, contains identical language. See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPfJBLICA DE
CUBA (1992), published in Gaceta Oficial, at 33, 36 (Aug. 1, 1992).
41 It is significant that in enacting a new Foreign Investment Law in
September 1995, Cuba included express assurances against the uncompensated
taking of assets of foreign investors:
Art. 3. Foreign investments in the national territory enjoy full
protection and security, and cannot be expropriated, save for reasons
of public utility or social interest, declared by the Government in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the laws in effect,
and international agreements signed by Cuba on the reciprocal
promotion and protection of investments, and subject to prior
indemnification in freely convertible currency for their commercial
value, established by mutual agreement.
In the event no such agreement is reached, the value will be set by a
firm with internationally recognized credentials in business valuation,
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3. WHY U.S. NATIONALS' CLAIMS SHOULD BE RESOLVED
PROMPTLY
The resolution of outstanding property claims of U.S.
nationals is an urgent matter that must be addressed in the early
stages of Cuba's transition. There are several reasons for this
urgency. First, U.S. laws arguably require resolution of U.S.
nationals' expropriation claims before the embargo on trade with
Cuba is lifted and foreign aid resumed.42 Second, the Cuban
authorized by the Ministry of Finance and Prices and hired to that
effect by agreement of the parties, or of the foreign investor and the
Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, if the
affectec[ party is an enterprise with wholly foreign capital.
Ley Numero 77, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 5, 6 (Sept. 6, 1995) (translation
by author). Except for the failure to provide recourse in Cuban courts, which
foreign investors may not find desirable in any event, the guarantees against
expropriation in the new Foreign Investment Law are essentially the same as
those in Art. 24 of the 1940 Constitution. See supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
42 See 22 U.S.C. S 2370 (a)(2) (1994) (prohibiting U.S. assistance to Cuba
until Cuba has taken "appropriate steps according to international law standards
to return to United States citizens, and to entities not less than 50 per centumn
beneficially owned by United States citizens, or to provide equitable compensa-
tion to such citizens and entities for property taken from such citizens and
entities on or after January 1, 1959, by the Government of Cuba"). A more
recent statute, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-484, 106 Stat.
2575, (codified as 22 U.S.C. S 6001-10 (1992)), sets very specific conditions for
the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. It makes no reference,
however, to payment of compensation to U.S. citizens for the Cuban
Government's expropriations as a pre-condition to lifting the embargo and
resuming economic assistance to Cuba. See Section 1708(b)(3) of the Cuban
Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. S 6007(b)(3); see generally, Matias F. Travieso-Diaz,
Requirements for Lifting the U.S. Trale Embargo Against Cuba, in 3 CUBA IN
TRANSITION - THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE
STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 222 (1993) (discussing the requirements that
must be met before the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba is lifted and before
U.S. aid is made available to Cuba).
Recently enacted legislation to provide aid to a democratically elected
government in Cuba would make assistance to Cuba contingent upon its
"making demonstrable progress" in returning the expropriated properties to
U.S. citizens or providing full compensation to their owners. Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 5
206(6), 109 Stat. 785 [hereinafter LIBERTAD Act]. The wording of this section
is ambiguous, in that it refers to "U.S. citizens," a term not defined in the
statute, leaving it open to the interpretation that the claims of all those who
were U.S. citizens at the time of enactment - including naturalized Cubans -
would have to be addressed before the embargo is lifted and aid to Cuba
resumed. See id.
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government will need to quickly resolve to the outstanding
expropriation claims by both U.S. and Cuban nationals to assure
domestic order, promote political and economic stability, expedite
privatization, and foster foreign investment. 4 Third, resolution
of U.S. nationals' claims will diminish the perceived political risks
of investing in Cuba. These risks are a matter of concern to most
prospective investors, traders, and financial institutions from the
United States and other countries.44 Finally, since President
Kennedy's administration, resolution of U.S. nationals' expropria-
tion claims has been an integral part of the stated political
requirements for the normalization of relations between the
United States and Cuba. Settlement of these claims is also a
necessary precondition for lifting the U.S. trade embargo against
Cuba.45
The presence of these factors demands the speedy negotiation
4' All countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have implemented
schemes to settle expropriation claims have experienced a great deal of
uncertainty over property rights. This uncertainty has discouraged potential
investors and has delayed privatization efforts. See Cheryl W. Gray et al.,
Evolving Legal Frameworks for Private Sector Development in Central and
Eastern Europe 4 (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 209) (1993). While it
appears inevitable that the claims resolution process will have some impact on
Cuba's economic transition, the rapid development of a claims resolution plan
would help minimize this impact.
" See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign
Investment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme, 21
INT'L LAW. 671, 685-88 (1987). In recent years, a number of investors from
other countries either have withdrawn from Cuba or have decided not to invest
on account of the unsettled status of the property claims issue and the
possibility that they may be subject to lawsuits by former property owners.
See, e.g., Head of Chamber of Commerce Assesses Foreign Investment, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; Ann Davis, Helms to Cuba: See You in Court, NAT'L LJ.,
July 10, 1995, at Al, A23.
45 See Lisa Shuchman, U.S. Won't Ease Embargo Against Cuba, Official Says,
PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 29, 1994, at 5B (quoting Dennis Hays, then
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, U.S. Department of State, explaining that
before the United States lifts the trade embargo against Cuba, the Cuban
expropriation of U.S. property will have to be addressed); Frank J. Prial, U.N.
Votes to Urge U.S. to Dismantle Embargo on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992,
at Al (quoting Alexander Watson, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations that the
United States chooses not to trade with CuBa because "among other things
Cuba, 'in violation of international law, expropriated billions of dollars worth
of private property belonging to U.S. individuals and has refused to make
reasonable restitution").
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of an agreement between the United States and Cuba regarding
the resolution of expropriation claims. No international law
principles or bilateral policy issues, however, require that Cuba
provide a remedy to domestic claimants for the expropriation of
their assets by the government.46 Therefore, the resolution of
Cuban nationals' expropriation claims can proceed on a separate
but perhaps parallel track and can be handled as a domestic Cuban
policy issue.
47
46 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861 (2d Cir.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923 (1964); F. Palicio y
Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affid per
curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F.
Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affid, 383 F.2d 1966 (2d. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 956 (1968); Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.Supp. 209, 215 (N.D.
Ill. 1982); see also RESTATEMENT (TIHID) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 702
cmt. k (1986).
" Many Cuban nationals whose properties were seized by the Cuban
Government subsequently moved to the United States and became U.S.
citizens. Some of these Cuban-Americans advocate being added to the U.S.
claimants class so they can be included in an eventual U.S.-Cuba settlement.
Alternatively, they do not wish to be recognized as being bound by an agree-
ment between the United States and Cuba, thereby permitting them to pursue
their claims separately in U.S. courts. See Alberto Diaz-Masvidal, Scope, Nature
and Implications of Contract Assignments on Cuban Natural Resources (Mineral
and Petroleum), Address at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Association for
the Study of the Cuban Economy, Miami, Florida, 54-62 (Aug. 1994).
The original version of the recently enacted Libertad Act would have
provided the relief sought by the above-mentioned Cuban-Americans amending
the Cuba Claims Act to allow U.S. citizens to file expropriation claims against
Cuba with the FCSC, regardless of whether the claimants were U.S. nationals
at the time of expropriation. See, e.g., H.R. 927, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
S 303(b). Such a provision, however, was dropped from the bill during
Congressional deliberations.
Nonetheless, there is some precedent for including the claims of individuals
who became U.S. citizens after the expropriations in the settlement of U.S.
claims against another country. See Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 2, at
223 n.22. Such an inclusion would require legislation amending the Cuban
Claims Act along the lines of the early version of the LIBERTAD Act or the
bill passed by Congress in 1955 to include individuals who were U.S. citizens
as of August 1955 in the U.S. war claims against Italy. See 22 U.S.C. S 1641c
(1994). Enactment of such legislation, however, will almost certainly be
opposed by the existing certified U.S. claimants, whose share of a lump
settlement would be decreased if the claimant class were enlarged and if the
negotiated settlement amount will be less than one hundred percent of the
certified value of the claims. In addition, such legislation would raise numerous
legal questions, including its potential inconsistency with well-settled
international law principles under which a state can oly act to protect the
interests of those who were nationals of that state at the time of the expropria-
tions. See D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 530-31 (2d. ed. 1976).
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4. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR U.S. EXPROPRIATION
CLAIMANTS
4.1. Introduction
Any proposal for the resolution of U.S. nationals' expropria-
tion claims must recognize the objectives that such a claims
resolution program must achieve, as well as the fundamental
differences between the various types of property subject to
claims. Further, such a proposal must recognize the practical
limitations that the Cuban government will encounter as it seeks
to provide remedies to both U.S. and domestic expropriation
victims. The interaction between these factors adds a significant
degree of complexity to the existing problem.
The objectives that a remedial program should strive to
achieve include: (1) providing predictable and substantially fair
treatment to all interested parties;41 (2) creating, in the shortest
possible time, a regime of clear, secure, and marketable rights to
property;49 (3) promoting the expeditious privatization of state-
held assets; 0 (4) encouraging the early onset of substantial foreign
investment;5' and (5) keeping.the aggregate remedial cost within
the nation's financial means.5 2 The pursuit of these objectives,
which are in many ways inconsistent with each other, suggests
that some remedies, such as making cash payments to claimants,
must be used sparingly, while others, like direct restitution of
confiscated properties, may be unsuitable in circumstances where
protracted title disputes are likely to arise.
Fundamental differences among the property interests covered
by the claims suggest that certain remedies may be better suited
for some types of property than for others. For example,
restitution of residential property may be extremely difficult, both
from a legal and political standpoint. 3 Additionally, monetary
48 See Cuban Claims Resolution, supra note 2, at 24445.
49 See id.
50 See id.
5' See id.
52 See id.
" See Juan C. Consuegra-Barquin, Cuba's Residential Property Ownership
Dilemma: A Human Rights Issue Under International Law, 46 RUTGERS L. REV.
873 (1994) (discussing the difficulties that a Cuban transition government will
face in seeking to provide remedies for residential property expropriations).
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compensation may be an inadequate remedy where the property
is unique, such as beachfront real estate in a resort area.
Cuba will also be confronted with political as well as financial
limitations in its ability to provide certain remedies. A settlement
involving huge financial obligations over a long period of time
may be resisted politically by, among others, the new generation
that has come of age in the country after the expropriations were
carried out.m
The following section discusses how the aforementioned
factors come into play with regard to possible remedies.
4.2. The Standard "Lump Sum" Settlement Approach
The President of the United States has wide, but not plenary,
power to settle claims against foreign governments that take
property belonging to U.S. citizens without compensation.
5 5
The U.S. Department of State, under authority delegated by the
President, acts on behalf of U.S. claimants in the negotiation of
their claims with an expropriating foreign country.6 Under the
"doctrine of espousal," the negotiations conducted by the
Department of State are binding on the claimants. The settlement
reached constitutes their sole remedy.57
In most agreements negotiated in the past, the United States
and the expropriating country have arrived at a settlement
involving payment by the expropriating country to the United
States of an amount that is a fraction - sometimes a small
fraction - of the total estimated value of the confiscated assets.5 8
" See Emilio Cueto, Property Claims of Cuban Nationals, Address at the
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbrid~e Workshop on Resolution of Property
Claims in Cuba's Transition, Washington, D.C. 9-12 Gan. 1995).
15 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); Shanghai Power
Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 244-45 (1983), afd mem., 765 F.2d 159
(Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985). The President's authority is
limited, however, by the rarely exercised power of Congress to enact legislation
requiring renegotiation of a settlement it perceives as unfavorable. See Dames
& Moore, 453 U.S. at 687-88 & n.13.
I See 453 U.S. at 680 n.9 Oistin ten settlement agreements reached by the
U.S. Department of State with foreign countries between 1952 and 1979).
" See id. at 679-80; Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States,
735 F.2d 1517, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 1 RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H.
WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM
AGREEMENTS 6 (1975).
For example, the United States settled its nationals' claims against the
People's Republic of China for $80.5 million, which was about forty percent
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Settlement proceeds are then distributed among the claimants in
proportion to their losses. In most cases, the settlement does not
include accrued interest.
5 9
Under standard practice, U.S. claimants may not "opt out" of
a settlement reached by the U.S. government. Dissatisfied
claimants are barred from pursuing their claims before U.S. courts
or courts of the settling country.'
The above-described traditional settlement agreement does not
appear, in itself, to satisfy the needs of the parties in the Cuban
situation. The sum of outstanding certified claims by U.S.
nationals against the Cuban government is so large that it would
likely exceed Cuba's ability to pay a significant portion of the
principal, let alone the interest.6' In addition, Cuba's transition
government already will be burdened by a very large external debt
- Cuba has defaulted on $9 billion worth of loans (excluding
accrued interest) from international private and public lenders in
the West.62 As a result, Cuba is not eligible for credit from Paris
Club members or private lenders.6' Also, Cuba owes Russia, as
of the $197 million certified by the FCSC. See Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct.
at 239; 18 I.L.M. 551, 551 (May 1979).
19 A 1992 settlement with Germany over East Germany's expropriations
of U.S. nationals' assets included the payment of simple interest at the approxi-
mate annual rate of 3% from the time the U.S. properties were taken. See
Letter from Ronald J. Bettauer, Assistant Legal Adviser for International
Claims and Investment Disputes, U.S. Department of State, to claimants (May
29, 1992); Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims,
May 13, 1992, U.S.-F.R.G., T.I.A.S. 11959 [hereinafter German Agreement].
60 See Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct. 237.
61 Cuba's Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") in 1994 was 12.8 billion pesos.
CONSULTORES AsocIADos, S.A., CUBA: INVERSIONES Y NEGOCIOS 38 (1995).
At the current black market rate of 25 pesos to a dollar, Cuba's GDP is
equivalent to about $500 million, less than a third of the principal amount of
the claims certified to U.S. nationals. See Cuba Releases Details of its External
Debt, J. COM., Nov. 20, 1995, at 8A.
62 See Cuba Releases Details of its External Debt, supra note 61, at 8A;
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism
in the USSR and Eastern Europe, in CUBA AFTER THE COLD WAR 133, 151
(Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993). See also ERNEST H. PREEG & JONATHAN D.
LEVINE, CUBA AND THE NEW CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ORDER 57 (Roberta L.
Howard et. al. eds., 1993) (stating that Cuba owes non-U.S. western creditors
$8 billion).
63 In 1986, Cuba unsuccessfully sought to renegotiate debt payments with
its Paris Club creditors, and afterwards declared a moratorium on debt-services
payments. See GLLAN GUNN, CUBA IN TRANSITION - OPTIONS FOR U.S.
POLICY 27 (1993). Because of Cuba's drop in creditworthiness, it was forced
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successor to the Soviet Union, more than $20 billion in loans that
were never repaid." Any additional obligations to U.S. claim-
ants would only exacerbate Cuba's bleak debt situation.
For these reasons, a traditional settlement involving the
payment of a large sum of money, even if payment is spread out
over time, likely would place Cuba in very difficult financial
straits. Such a settlement could also have adverse political
65repercussions.
It would be possible, however, for Cuba and the United States
to arrive at a negotiated settlement as an alternative to a monetary
payment. Under such a settlement, individual claimants would
formally waive their right to receive a share of the lump sum
settlement proceeds and instead negotiate directly with the Cuban
Government for restitution of their expropriated assets. Alterna-
tive methods of restitution can take the form of investment
concessions, payments in commodities other than cash, or
payments in the form of Cuban government obligations. The
next sections explore these possibilities under the assumption that
such a flexible settlement will ultimately be adopted, since it
appears to be in the best interest of all parties.66
The expansion of settlement alternatives to include other
to rely mostly on trade with socialist countries and to sharply curtail hard
currency imports. See i; see also Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Cuba Seeks to Revamp
Its Defaulted Debt, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1995, at C1.
6See CARMELO MESA-LAGO, ARE ECONOMIc REFORMS PROPELLING
CUBA TO THE MARKET? 5 (1994).
65 See Cueto, supra note 54, at 9-12, 34-36.
66 There are indications that at least some ma'or U.S. claimants would be
interested in alternative methods to settle their claims. See Amstar Says, Let's
Make a Deal, CUBA NEWS, Jan. 1996, at 6. There is also precedent or such
flexibility. The recent U.S. settlement agreement with Germany, for example,
allows U.S. nationals to forego their portions of the settlement amount and
instead pursue their claims under Germany's program. for the resolution of
claims arising from East Germany's expropriations. See German Agreement,
supra note 59, Art. 3; 57 Fed. Reg. 53,175, 53,176 (Nov. 1992).
The intra-governmental negotiations between the United States and Cuba
would have to include means for assuring that once claimants waive the right
to be represented by the U.S. government in the negotiations with Cuba and
enter into direct negotiations with that country f6r the resolution of their
claims, Cuba would give them fair and reasonable treatment. One possibility
could be for Cuba to agree to submit any claim it was unable to settle with a
U.S. national. Such arbitration could be conducted, for example, by a tribunal
analogous to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal set up to resolve the expropriation
claims of U.S. nationals against Iran. See Norton, supra note 28, at 482-86.
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remedies would not eliminate the need for a lump 'sum payment
by Cuba to U.S. nationals. Such a payment could be set aside to
satisfy the claims of those for whom other alternative remedies
would be undesirable or impracticable.67 Lump sum settlement
proceeds, for example, could provide limited monetary compensa-
tion to all claimants to the extent of their certified losses involving
residential and small farm properties.68 As another example, a
lump sum payment of $150 million would provide over 50%
principal recovery to the 5,013 certified individual claimants.69
4.3. The Direct Restitution Alternative
Many U.S. corporate claimants might prefer a solution
providing for restitution of the actual confiscated property ("direct
restitution").,0 Some types of expropriated property, such as
67 There are approximately $150 million in blocked Cuban assets held in
the United States, although some portions may not belong to Cuba. See
Stanley J. Glod, Potential Approaches to the Resolution of U.S. Claims, Address
at the Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Workshop on Resolution of
Property Claims in Cuba's Transition, Washington, D.C. 3 san. 1995) (copy
on file with the U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.). These assets could be used to fund
the lump-sum payments.
68 Residential property and small farms are good candidates for a
compensation remedy because such a remedy avoids the potential need to
dispossess current occupants to those properties, who already may have
acquired legal rights to them and whose eviction might be politically untenable.
See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 53, at 909-12.
69 A fifty percent level of recovery would exceed the recovery level in most
"lump sum" settlements negotiated by the United States under the International
Claims Settlement Act programs. See 1994 FCSC REPORT, supra note 16, at
146.
70 Restitution has been used as the remedy of choice for expropriations in
many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, the Baltic republics, Bulgaria, and Romania. See Anna Gelpern, The Laws
and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Europe.: A Comparison, 14 U. PA.
J. INT'L BUS. L. 315, 315 (1993). On the other hand, Hungary, Russia, and all
other former republics of the USSR (with the exception of the Baltic states)
have expressly refused to grant restitution of property expropriated during the
communist era. See Frances H. Foster, Post-Soviet Approaches to Restitution:
Lessons for Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSmON: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE
CHALLENGE OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES 93 (foAnn Klein ed., 1994).
The former Czechoslovakia provides a good example of the restitution
approach. Czechoslovakia implemented an aggressive, across-the-board
restitution program under which it enacted a series of restitution laws that
distinguished between "small" property (such as small businesses and apartment
buildings), "large" property, and agricultural lands and forests, with each type
of property being subject to somewhat different procedures and remedies. See
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large industrial installations, may lend themselves to direct
restitution since the identity of the former owners is likely to be
uncontested and the extent of the ownership rights may be
relatively easy to establish."
In some cases, the ability to grant restitution of the actual
property seized by the Cuban government may be impossible.
The property may have been destroyed or may have substantially
deteriorated. The property may have been transformed, subdivid-
ed, improved, or otherwise changed. It may have been devoted
to a use not easily reversed or providing substantial public utility.
Finally, for policy reasons the State may decide not to return the
property to its former owners. In these cases, some other form
of compensation is necessary.
In addition, Cuba is entering into a number of joint ventures
with foreign (non-U.S.) investors. 2 Many of these ventures
involve property expropriated from U.S. and Cuban nationals. 3
In deciding whether to provide direct restitution for those
Gray et al., supra note 43, at 49. The restitution of "small" property was
governed by the Small Federal Restitution Law, which provided for direct
restitution to original owners. See id. The Large Federal Restitution Law gov-
erned the restitution of "large" property (industries and associated real estate),
and again provided for the return of the property to its former owners, except
in situations where the property was in use by natural persons or foreign
entities, in which case restitution was barred and compensation had to be paid
instead. See Gelpern, supra 337-38 (1993). Likewise, for agricultural land and
forests, the Fedeial Land Law provided presumptive restitution of lands to the
original owners. See id. Where neither the land originally expropriated nor a
substantially similar parcel in the locality was available, financial compensation
was provided as an alternative remedy. See id.
" The 20 largest U.S. claimants, in terms of amounts certified by the
FCSC, are all corporations. See 1994 FCSC Report, supra note 16; infra App.
A. Their combined certified claims total $1.25 billion, or seventy percent of
the total claims certified. See id. Most of the corporations owned large
industrial installations that would be readily identifiable.
72 As of mid-1995, Cuba reported it had established 212 economic
associations, including joint ventures, with foreign partners. See Cuba Reports
Foreign Investment Exceeding $2 Bln, REUTER TEXTLINE, July 10, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Txtlne File. Spain leads the way in terms
of the number of joint ventures undertaken by its nationals in Cuba, but
Mexico and Canada surpass Spain in the reported total amount of investment.
See Jos6 A. Ferrs & Pascal Fletcher,S ts Old Ties in New Havana -
the Former Colonial Power is Helping to Lead the Way in Investment in Cuba,
FIN. TIMES, July 20, 1995 at 4. For a listing of foreign investors engaged in
joint ventures in Cuba, see An Index of Foreign Investment in Cuba, LA
SOCIEDAD ECONOMICA, Bull. 43 (Sept. 1994).
' See An Index of Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 72, at 43.
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properties to the U.S. claimants, a Cuban transition government
will have to balance the rights and interests of the former owners
against those of third-parties investors in Cuba. Likewise, the
rights of, any other lessors, occupants, or other users of the
property would have to be considered in the decision to grant
direct restitution.
When direct restitution is the appropriate remedy, a number
of matters will have to be negotiated between Cuba and the
claimants. For example, Cuba may want to impose restrictions or
requirements on the claimants' use of the property or on their
ability to transfer title for a certain period of time after restitu-
tion. Also, a potentially complex valuation process may be
needed if the property has been improved since being expropriat-
ed. In some instances, an agreement will need to be made in
advance on the recovering owners' responsibility for the environ-
mental reclamation of the property, to the extent that long-term
impacts from operation of the facility have occurred. Many other
issues are likely to come up in individual cases.
Cuba may also choose to impose a "transfer tax" or equivalent
fee on the restitution transaction. Such a tax would raise funds
for other aspects of the program and ensure that the settlement of
the claim by restitution does not leave a claimant in a better
position than that of other claimants who have availed themselves
of other forms of limited recovery, such as partial compensation.
4.4. Substitutional Restitution
There may be instances where direct restitution will be
impractical, but both Cuba and the U.S. claimants still will wish
to apply a restitution type of remedy. Such circumstances may
dictate restitution of substitute property through the transfer to
the claimant of other property equivalent in value to the confiscat-
ed property. Where restitution of substitute property is proposed,
it is necessary to establish rules regarding, among other things,
how the equivalence of the properties is to be defined and
determined.
This sort of substitutional restitution may be appropriate, for
example, in cases where the confiscated property is farmland that
has been conveyed to cooperatives or divided among small
farmers. Rather than dispossessing the current occupants, Cuba
may offer to convey to the U.S. claimants agricultural or other
lands in state hands equivalent in value to the expropriated
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properties.
Direct and substitutional restitution programs implemented in
certain Eastern European countries have been criticized on
economic grounds.74 In addition, some analysts have concluded
that the use of restitution in Cuba would do more harm than
good.75 There are those, however, who prefer that restitution of
expropriated properties to the former owners has a positive
economic impact.76
z" The restitution experience in Eastern Europe has been summarized as
follows:
Restitution-in-kind is complex and leaves many problems in its wake.
The legal precedence typically given restitution over privatization has
created great uncertainty among potential investors and has complicat-
ed privatization, particularly in the case of small businesses and
housing. It is also leading to many disputes that are beginning to clog
the courts. In Romania, for example, restitution of agricultural land
has led to more than 300,000 court cases.
Gray et al., supra note 43, at 4. The same criticism is leveled against similar
restitution programs instituted in the former Czechoslovakia. See id. at 49.
s For example, in evaluating the potential implementation of a restitution
program in Cuba in light of the experiences in the Baltic republics, one
commentator writes:
[R]estitution . .. could delay the establishment of stable, marketable
legal title to assets, a critical requirement for both privatization and
domestic and foreign investment. Moreover, it could further drain an
already depleted Cuban national treasury. A Baltic-style restitution
program would obligate the Cuban state either to turn over state and
collective property gratuitously or to pay equivalent compensation.
In the Cuban case this would be particularly onerous because of the
sheer enormity of U.S. claims for "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation for expropriated property.
Finally, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania indicate that restitution
could have a severe socioeconomic impact on current Cuban citizens.
As in these three states, the Cuban government has heavily subsidized
the living expenses of its population. It has prevented its citizens from
significant acquisition of assets and, until recently, legally prohibited
them from accumulating hard currency. Thus, if Cuba should elect to
return property to former owners (many of whom are foreign
corporations or emigres) and to introduce free market mechanisms, its
present population would be at a competitive disadvantage.
Foster, supra note 70, at 113 (footnotes omitted).
76 See Gutierrez, supra note 11, at 17. Gutierrez writes that:
[F]ull restitution of all non-materially altered industrial, commercial
and agricultural properties to their legitimate owners will not only
carry out the justice required for social peace, but it will also place the
means of production in the hands of those entrepreneurs which had
elevated Cuba to the top of nearly every socio-economic index in Latin
America prior to the communist revolution. By creating constitu-
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The restitution of properties in Cuba to U.S. claimants also
has been specifically opposed because it would "lock the country
back into a sugar-dominated structure of production" and "would
be tantamount to insisting that nationalistic feelings in Cuba due
to foreign ownership of the country's principal assets never had
a basis in fact."' Despite these concerns, it can be safely antici-
pated that U.S. nationals, at the conclusion of the claims settle-
ment process, once again will be major participants in Cuba's
economy.
Restitution - whether direct or by substitution - is likely to
be a significant, but not necessarily a leading, ingredient in the
mix of remedies granted to U.S. claimants. It will be inappropri-
ate in many instances, and even where appropriate, its use should
be tempered by the realization that restitution often is a slow and
difficult process subject to contentious disputes among a variety
of claimants, including former owners, their successors, current
occupants, and many others.7
tional and other legal incentives to encourage the unleashing of the
creative energies of the Cuban people (both on the island and in exile),
Cuba can rapidly earn foreign exchange through exports, produce
abundantly for its own domestic consumption, employ workers at real
jobs paying in a currency that has value (unlike today's Cuban peso),
and restore labor rights. The economic multiplier effect of this
combined economic activity will rapidly return prosperity to the
island.
Id.
77 Castafieda & Montalvain, supra note 4, at 14. The concerns expressed by
these authors reflect apprehension over a return to the significant role played
by U.S. investors in the Cuban economy at the time of the 1959 Revolution,
when U.S. investments in Cuba amounted to roughly one-third of the capital
value of Cuba's industrial plant. See ERIC N. BAKLANOFF, EXPROPRIATIONS
OF U.S. INVESTMENTS iN CUBA, MEXico, AND CHILE 27, 33 & n.43 (1975).
At that time, U.S.-owned enterprises dominated or played leading roles in the
agricultural, mining, manufacturing, petroleum, and utility industries. See id.
at 12-31.
71 In the former Czechoslovakia, for example, restitution has led to
numerous disputes between original owners and current occupants, as well as
disputes between competing claimants, resulting in clogged courts. See Gray et
al., supra note 43, at 49. In addition, "the legal precedence given restitution
over privatization has created great uncertainty among potential investors and
has complicated privatization, particularly in the case of small businesses and
housing." Id.
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4.5. Payment by Means of State-Issued Instruments
A number of Eastern European countries have used state-issued
instruments, often referred to as "vouchers," to provide full or
partial compensation to expropriation claimants. 79  These
vouchers may not be redeemed for cash, but they can be used as
collateral for loans; as payment, fully or in part, for property sold
by the State, including shares in privatized enterprises; to purchase
real estate put up for sale by the State; in exchange for annuities;
or as investment instruments.0
The voucher system provides another potential way of
resolving many of the U.S. nationals' expropriation claims in
Cuba, particularly those of the former owners of small and
medium enterprises who may not be interested in recovering the
properties they once owned because of the obsolescence or
physical deterioration of the facilities.81 This system recognizes
the limits of Cuba's ability to pay compensation claims and avoids
the dislocation costs and disputes associated with direct restitution
systems. As with restitution remedies, an issue that must be
resolved at the outset is the level of compensation to be offered in
proportion to the incurred loss.
71 Hungary has used compensation vouchers as the sole means of
indemnifying expropriation claimants. See Katherine Simonetti et al.,
Compensation and Resolution of Property Claims in Hungary, in CUBA IN
TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF EXPROPRIATED
PROPERTI.S 61, 69 ([oAnn Klein ed., 1994). The means of compensation are
interest-bearing transferable securities, caled compensation "vouchers" or
"coupons," issued by a Compensation Office charged with the administration
of the claims program. See id. The vouchers can be traded as securities, and
pay interest at seventy-five percent of the prime rate set by the central bank.
See id. at 69. Compensation is given on a sliding scale with regard to the
assessed value of the lost property. See Gray et al., supra note 43, at 70.
" See Simonetti et al., supra note 79, at 69-72. In Hungary, vouchers can
also be used to purchase farmland in auctions held by the state. Only the
former owners of such land, however, may use their vouchers for this purpose.
See id. at 69-70.
"I A Cuban economist has included the issuance of vouchers as an option
for providing compensation to U.S. corporate claimants. See Pedro Monreal,
"Las Reclamaciones del Sector Privado de los Estados Unidos Contra Cuba: Una
Perspectiva Acad6mica," presented at the Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
Workshop on Resolution of Property Claims in Cuba's Transition, Wash-
ington, D.C. 5 (fan. 1995). The alternative proposed by Monreal would require
the claimant to invest in Cuba an amount equal to the value of the coupons he
or she has received. See id.
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This system potentially has great flexibility, for the vouchers
could be used for a variety of purposes, some more attractive than
others to individual claimants. In addition to vouchers, other
state-issued instruments could be used to compensate U.S
claimants. These include annuities, bonds, promissory notes,
stock certificates in privatized enterprises, or a combination of
several of these forms.
There are, however, several potential drawbacks to a system
of vouchers or other state-issued instruments. 2  These instru-
ments will fluctuate in value and are likely to depreciate in value
if Cuba's economic recovery falters.8 3 In addition, to the extent
that the instruments are used as income-generating devices, such
as for the collection of annuities, the rate of return is likely to be
very low.84 Also, the basic underpinning of a voucher system is
confidence in the state's ability to make good on its obligations.
Therefore, the security, transferability, and marketability of the
compensation instruments are serious concerns that the Cuban
transition government will need to address in order for this
remedy to satisfy the U.S. claimants.
4.6. Other Remedies
Other remedies that might be utilized in Cuba - and have not
yet been tried elsewhere - run the gamut from economic
incentives to investment in the country itself. Alternative
remedies could include: (1) credits on taxes and duties to the
extent of all or part of the claim amount; (2) the ability to
exchange the claim for other investment opportunities, such as
management contracts, beneficial interests in state-owned enter-
prises, and preferences in government contracting; and (3) other
benefits.8" Each claimant may be interested in a different
82 For a brief discussion of some of the valuation and financing issues that
will surface if Cuba seeks to implement a compensation scheme, see Cueto,
supra note 54, at 26-28; Castafieda & Montalvin, supra note 4, at 14-16.
" This depreciation occurred, for example, in the Slovak Republic. See
Heather V. Weibel, Note, Avenues for Investment in the Former Czechoslovakia:
Privatization and the Historical Development of the New Commercial Code, 18
DEL. J. CORP. L. 889, 921-22 (1993).
84 In Hungary, the use of vouchers to collect annuities has yielded
disappointing results. See Simonetti et al., supra note 79, at 78.
8 See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features
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"package," so case-by-case negotiations should be conducted, at
least to resolve the most significant claims.86
5. CONCLUSION
A time will come when the United States and Cuba will set
out to negotiate a settlement of the expropriation claims of U.S.
nationals against the Cuban government. The date of such an
event is uncertain, but it is very likely that the negotiations will
be conducted while Cuba is besieged by a depressed economy and
an unstable political situation.
The conditions under which the settlement will be negotiated
will greatly restrict the variety of remedies that Cuba will be able
to offer the claimants. Certainly, the traditional way of settling
expropriation claims - a lump sum of money paid to the U.S.
government for pro rata distribution among all claimants - will
not be adequate, given Cuba's inability to pay a significant
portion of the amounts it currently owes. Lump-sum compensa-
tion should be given to the extent that funds are available but
should also be substituted with a variety of other remedies to be
negotiated with Cuba by those claimants wishing to opt out of
the lump-sum settlement. These other remedies can include
restitution of the expropriated assets, compensation through state-
issued instruments, and numerous other means. While the
eventual solution reached in each case will likely only grant partial
recovery to the claimant, the results in most cases would probably
be more beneficial to the claimants than a lump-sum distribution.
Case-by-case negotiation is, however, likely to be a difficult
and time-consuming process. Therefore, both the Cuban
government and the claimants should be prepared to exhibit
flexibility in working towards a fair and reasonable resolution of
the claims, and they should approach any negotiations in good
faith and with a cooperative attitude.
of a Foreign Investment Code for Cuba's Free-Market Transition, 21 N.C. J INT'L
L. & COMP. REG. (forthcoming 1996) (discussing incentives to foreign
investment in Cuba that could also be offered to U.S. claimants in settlement
of their claims).
36 See A.R.M. Ritter, Financial Aspects of Normalizing Cuba's International
Relations: The Debt and Compensation Issues, in TRANSITION IN CUBA - NEW
CHALLENGES FOR U.S. PoLIcY 501, 559 (Lisandro Perez ed., 1993).
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APPENDIX A
U.S EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA WITH
CERTIFIED AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF $1 MILLION
RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
DECISION #
4122
3578
6049
3824
5969
3969
5013
3838
6066
5013
4546
6020
6034
6247
6818
CLAM #
2578
2622
2619
2776
665
2445
2615
938
2500
2615
1331
2525
2156
2624
1743
CLAIMANT
NAME
Cuban Electric Com-
pany
North American
Sugar Industries, Inc.
Moa Bay Mining
Company
United Fruit Sugar
Company
West Indies Sugar
Corporation
American Sugar Com-
pany
ITT Corporation -
Trustee
Standard Oil Compa-
ny
Francisco Sugar Com-
pany
International Tele-
phone and Telegraph
Texaco, Inc.
Manati Sugar Compa-
ny
Bangor Punta Corp.
Nicaro Nickel Com-
pany
Coca-Cola Company
CERTIFIED
AMOUNT
$267,568,414.00
$97,373,415.00
$88,349,000.00
$85,100,147.00
$84,880,958.00
$81,011,240.00
$80,002,794.00
$71,611,003.00
$58,505,859.00
$50,676,964.00
$50,081,110.00
$48,587,848.00
$39,203,334.00
$33,014,083.00
$27,526,239.00
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RANK DECISION #
16 6217
17 6817
18 4547
6057
3866
4839
3578
6031
4234
4212
26 4071
4511
5928
29 3713
30 6165
31 4545
32 3792
5627
3701
6812
36 3338
CLAIM # CLAIMANT
NAME
2355 Lone Star Cement
Corporation
1850 New Tuinucu Sugar
Company, Inc
730 Colgate Palmolive
Company
2526 Braga Brothers, Inc.
3548 Boise Cascade Corpo-
ration
2354 American Brands, Inc.
2622 West India Company
2338 Atlantic Richfield
Company
548 Burrus Mills, Inc.
3651 Pan-American Life
Insurance Company
3074 United States Rubber
Company, Ltd.
502 Powe, William A.
2269 Pingree, Sumner
Estate of
1319 Woolworth, EW.
Company
2492 Havana Docks Corpo-
ration
2521 InterContinental
Hotels Corporation
778 Continental Can
Company, Inc.
7659 Loeb, John L.
2644 Owns Illinois, Inc.
3503 Brothers of Order of
Hermits St. Augustin
1330 Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company
CERTIFIED
AMOUNT
$24,881,287.00
$23,336,080.00
$14,507,935.00
$12,612,873.00
$11,745,960.00
$11,679,901.00
$11,548,959.00
$10,216,645.00
$9,847,100.00
$9,742,800.00
$9,523,892.00
$9,507,786.00
$9,272,668.00
$9,188,256.00
$9,179,700.00
$8,934,371.00
$8,906,810.00
$8,573,096.00
$8,039,240.00
$7,885,099.00
$7,649,180.00
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RANK
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
DECISION #
3836
6294
6820
3231
6034
3976
3071
6143
5930
4783
4546
887
3393
6827
3835
1943
5970
6034
3875
CLAIM #
1393
2685
2545
2155
2156
2577
2268
2038
2275
1821
1332
887
569
3669
2628
2458
2620
2156
3089
CLAIMANT
NAME
Claflin, Helen A.
Chase Manhattan
Bank
Marks, Carl & Com-
pany, Inc.
IBM World Trade
Corporation
Baragua Industrial
Corp. of N.Y.
Swift & Company
First National Bank of
Boston
General Electric Com-
pany
Pingree, Sumner
Estate of
Libby, McNeill &
Libby
Texas Petroleum
Company
Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company
Proctor & Gamble
Company
Lengyel, Olga
First National City
Bank
International Harvest-
er Company
Davis, Arthur V.
Estate of
Macareno Industrial
Corp. of N.Y.
General Motors Cor-
poration
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CERTIFIED
AMOUNT
$7,508,690.00
$7,461,468.00
$7,333,001.00
$6,449,434.00
$6,280,722.00
$5,953,393.00
$5,904,941.00
$5,870,437,00
$5,814,526.00
$5,713,618.00
$5,143,433.00
$5,118,762.00
$4,996,256.00
$4,865,767.00
$4,863,731.00
$4,589,423.00
$4,267,083.00
$4,145,316.00
$3,877,702.00
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RANK DECISION #
56 5844
57 6034
58 1145
59 1943
60 3790
31
5743
3968
6001
65 4558
66 3716
69 6141
70 3655
5511
3836
4129
6201
5879
3908
3660
CLAIM # CLAIMANT
NAME
3088 General Motors Cor-
poration
2156 Florida Industrial
Corporation of N.Y.
385 Sears Roebuck and
Company
2459 International Harvest-
er Company
2279 Reynolds Metals
Company
133 Sherwin-Williams
Company
662 Lykes Brothers, Inc.
2326 Gillette Japan, Inc.
8292 International Standard
Electric Corp.
3335 American Securities
Corporation
244 Air Reduction Com-
pany, Inc.
1507 King Ranch, Inc.
1471 Leeder, Marsden
Robert
240 Calixto Lopez &
Company
2372 Du Pont Inter-Ameri-
can Chemical Co.
7649 Loeb, Frances L.
1395 Rentschler, Mary C.
3598
375
632
50
3489
de Arango, Mercedes
Goodrich, B.E
Pagliuca, Angel
Gache, Mac
Grace, W.R. & Com-
pany
1996]
CERTIFIED
AMOUNT
$3,806,648.00
$3,749,751.00
$3,704,957.00
$3,673,387.00
$3,438,844.00
$3,408,121.00
$3,383,226.00
$3,272,215.00
$3,263,440.00
$3,252,740.00
$3,251,766.00
$3,216,085.00
$3,202,086.00
$3,156,328.00
$2,995,683.00
$2,929,578.00
$2,927,190.00
$2,892,136.00
$2,768,801.00
$2,655,759.00
$2,628,150.00
$2,541,560.00
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RANK DECISION #
78 4129
83' 5754
3748
3967
3453
3745
30
6194
15
3837
6021
3680
3602
1043
96 3669
98 6084
99 3789
CLAIM # CLAIMANT
NAME
3599 Giroux, Carmen de
Arango
2590 University of Chicago
2510 Siboney Corporation
515 Roberts, Alexander M.
Sr.
202 Leone, Joseph Estate
of
1478 US Life Insurance
Company
2567 Armour & Company
1477 Duys H & Company,
Inc.
407 Shepard, Julius J.
277 Rutz, Anthony M.
538 Berwind Corporation
653 Burford, Richard D.
772 Avon Products, Inc.
2965 Hilton International
Company
1092 Garcia, Elsa
2470 Mathieson Pan-Ameri-
can Chemical
2035 Frederick Snare
Corproration
273 General Milk Compa-
ny
611 Rainbow Develop-
ment Corporation
3597 Pepsi-Cola Metro
Bottling Company
8773 Trexler, Harry C.
Trust of
2351 Canada Dry Corpora-
tion
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CERTIFIED
AMOUNT
$2,515,221.00
$2,500,000.00
$2,454,068.00
$2,258,674.00
$2,121,946.00
$2,065,266.00
$2,055,004.00
$2,046,298.00
$2,033,959.00
$1,992,423.00
$1,937,210.00
$1,865,868.00
$1,865,232.00
$1,854,575.00
$1,810,129.00
$1,794,710.00
$1,762,231.00
$1,732,612.00
$1,707,945.00
$1,646,766.00
$1,638,362.00
$1,633,114.00
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RANK DECISION #
3681
3724
6806
6806
3672
3832
6031
3061
6241
3747
3715
6191
665
3830
114 4429
115 5622
116 380
4966
6224
119 6200
4791
121 3932
122 5217
CLAIM # CLAIMANT
NAME
2126 Warner-Lambert SA
233 Cuba Grapefruit
Company, Inc.
1420 Shapiro, Wilma
1421 Shapiro, Charles
2469 Squibb, E.R. & Sons
Inter-America
3717 Everhart, Jack Fall
3017 Atlantic Refining
Company of Cuba
455 Tecon Corporation
1617 Fryer, Matthew A.
3566 Standard Brands, Inc.
2646 Sterling Drug, Inc.
2626 First National City
Bank
2987 McKenzie, Fred
3100 Doughertys, J.A.
Sons, Inc.
2775 United Fruit Compa-
ny
7647 Loeb, Frances L.
(U/W Lehman)
1900 Dana, Agnes L. Estate
of
373 Schultz, Alfred H.
2317 Western Union Tele-
graph Company
2692 McMasters, Helen
Hunt Jackson
2164 Kewanee Oil Compa-
ny
2495 Phillips, Edna A. Paul
Valentine
1530 PPG Industries, Inc.
1996]
CERTIFIED
AMOUNT
$1,591,138.00
$1,567,470.00
$1,555,646.00
$1,551,434.00
$1,523,329.00
$1,481,052.00
$1,382,314.00
$1,375,392.00
$1,368,930.00
$1,355,312.00
$1,326,475.00
$1,305,874.00
$1,303,523.00
$1,298,363.00
$1,270,728.00
$1,255,619.00
$1,250,000.00
$1,202,600.00
$1,155,654.00
$1,131,733.00
$1,125,917.00
$1,121,581.00
$1,090,068.00
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RANK
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
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DECISION #
5512
5752
6259
6234
1862
3842
3787
5907
5626
CLAIM #
7657
2864
1817
695
2592
2932
2476
3067
7658
CLAIMANT
NAME
Loeb, John L., Jr.
Griswold, Loomis D.
Estate of
Namarib Company
Harper, George K.
International Paper
Company
USM Pan-American,
Ltd.
General Dynamics
Corporation
Swetland, Frederick L.
Jr.
Davies, Deborah E
TOTAL
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CERTIFIED
AMOUNT
$1,088,014.00
$1,085,982.00
$1,082,667.00
$1,081,579.00
$1,071,518.00
$1,054,846.00
$1,035,891.00
$1,024,019.00
$1,012,180.00
$1,659,966,661.00
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